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A Land Link Across the Gibraltar Straits
The idea of  a Gibraltar tunnel first appeared in the mid XIX century, with the first
technical developments that led people to think, with excessive optimism, that the
project was possible. It was not until several attempts had failed, that a military
engineer appeared in the 30's with the conviction that a task of  this magnitude was
feasible. He cautiously took the first steps and initiated the necessary studies, and
even made the first surveys. But, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War
interrupted what had been a promising start. When the idea was taken up again, it
coincided with Moroccan independence and had to be discarded until very recently.
Ideja o Gibraltarskom tunelu prvi puta se pojavila sredinom XIX. stolje}a kada su
po~eci tehnolo{kog razvoja dali ljudima pretjerani optimizam pa su oni povjerovali
da je to mogu}e. Tek kad je nekoliko poku{aja propalo, u tridesetim godinama
dvadesetog stolje}a pojavio se jedan vojni in`enjer uvjeren da je zada}u ove veli~ine
mogu}e ostvariti. On je oprezno poduzeo prve korake i zapo~eo potrebne studije,
~ak je izradio prva mjerenja. Ali [panjolski gra|anski rat, a zatim i Drugi svjetski
rat, prekinuli su po~etak koji je mnogo obe}avao. Kad su se ljudi ponovno po~eli
baviti tom zamisli, ve} je do{lo vrijeme marokanske neovisnosti pa ju je do nedavno
bilo potrebno odbaciti.
Universidad de La Laguna
Facultad de Geografia e Historia
E - 38207 La Laguna, Tenerife, Canarias
Kolonijalna utopija
Kopnena veza preko Gibraltarskog tjesnaca
Original Scientific Paper • Izvorni znanstveni ~lanak
UDC • UDK 711.2:624
Scientific Classification • Znanstvena klasifikacija
Section: Technical Sciences • Podru~je: Tehni~ke znanosti
Field: Architecture and Urban Planning • Polje: Arhitektura i urbanizam
Branches • Grane: 2.01.04 Architect. and Urban Development • razvoj arh. i urb.
Manuscript Received • Rukopis primljen: 27.10.1999.
Article Accepted • ^lanak prihva}en: 29.03.2000.
A. Darias Principe: A Colonial ... Pag. 143-156Vol.7(1999), No.2(18)PROSTOR
144
1. Introduction / Uvod
The ties between Europe and Africa over the Gibraltar Straits is a
reality that goes back as far as man has inhabited this area,
despite the difficulty of  the straits. The stretch of  water between
two seas has never been an obstacle to establishing fluid relations
between people, cultures and traditions of  the two shores. Apart
from certain segregationist aspects like the difference in mentality
originated by different beliefs, the straits remain more of  a link
than a division.
2. The First Projects / Prvi projekti
Thus, when an optimistic spirit invaded society in the last century,
thanks to the techniques that enabled man to face and overcome
the barriers imposed by the physical world, one of  the first projects
that was tackled, however much of  a utopia it may have appeared,
was the idea of  creating a land link between the two shores of  the
straits.
In 1860, French engineer Laurent de Villedemil won a Spanish
government concession to build a tunnel under the straits. The
project was supported by the Pereyra bank and used a newspaper
entitled "The Gibraltar tunnel" as publicity. Unfortunately, the conditions
at the time were not ideal for the project – political instability, civil
war, the fall of  Elizabeth II – so the capital that had been provided
for the work was withdrawn and Villedemil went bankrupt. Some
members of  the military community – Generals Rubió, Sotomayor,
Ibañez de Ibero – considered the possibility of  continuing, but
there was not a sound enough geological or oceanographic project
on which to base the final plans1 .
From then on, one plan rapidly followed another. Villedemil was
followed by another Frenchmen. Juan Bautista Berlier, an engineer
who died in Deauville in 1911, presented another tunnel project
at the turn of  the century. Ever since he built the first underground
line for electric trams2 in Paris in the final years of  the last
century, he was obsessed by the idea of  a grand subterranean
gallery.  He was to try to use the new techniques of  electricity to
overcome the problems that led to the failure of  his predecessor
in the challenge of building a tunnel under the Gibraltar straits.
In 1918, another Frenchman, Henry Bressler, presented another
project to the French society of  civil engineers, based on similar
ideas to those of  Berlier. There was nothing new in his project
with regard to means for executing the work, because of  a lack
of  knowledge of  some of  the fundamental aspects of  the problem,
as the data contained in the charts of  the straits were insufficient,
so another project was quickly forgotten.3
Spanish studies, although late arrivals, were more exhaustive.
Engineer García Faria delivered a project for a railway link between
the Algerian and Spanish networks to the negotiators at the
Algeciras Conference. Moreover, this included a study of  a tunnel
link connecting the two continents. Later on, (1919), another
engineer, Carlos Mendoza came up with a revolutionary solution
consisting in a network of steel pipes that acted as a tunnel. The
thickness of  the pipes was to vary depending on the pressure
they had to support. The pipes would rest on the sea bed and
would be anchored to it. Mendoza considered a tube of  ten to
1 Anonymous: El Túnel
submarino bajo el estrecho
de Gibraltar In: "Revista
Hispanoafricana", June-July
1928, n. 6-7: 16.
2 Enciclopedia Universal
Ilustrada Europea-Ameri-
cana. Appendix, Vol. II.
Espasa Calpe – Madrid: 143.
3 Jimenez, E., El cruce del
Estrecho de Gibraltar in:
"Ingeniería y Construcción",
Madrid, July 1934. n. 139:
468.
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twelve metres in diameter and 30 cm thick, to take a single
torpedo-shaped carriage that, according to the engineer, "would
prevent local deformations " 4 .
The first work to be taken into consideration, however, was the
work of  engineer and writer Mariano Rubio y Bellvé, a soldier
born in Tarragona (Spain) in 1862. One of  his last publications,
published in 1920, was entitled "Comunicación a través del Estrecho
de Gibraltar" (Communication via the Gibraltar Straits). He started
writing it four years beforehand, so that, by 1918, he was able to
apply for help from the Ministry of  War, in the form of  the
technical data that were necessary for a conscientious study. He
asked for five years for carrying out the design. Through more
modern eyes, the work tended to be superficial, hardly surprising
if  we bear in mind the fact that basically, he was seeking
permission for carrying out a detailed study. The project did not
have a sound geological study but, on the other hand, it was the
first time that a more feasible layout was sought, even if  it was
longer. Thus, two routes were considered:
The narrowest part of  the straits is approximately 14 km wide,
but, according to the soundings taken, the depth reaches 600 metres,
which would mean digging down to 650 meters at the deepest point
of the tunnel, as this had to be well below the sea-bed. This meant
that, if  we accept a gradient of  25 millimetres per metre, the access
gallery to the lowest point would have to be 26 km long on each
side and the tunnel would have to be 58 km long.
In the other route, under the Atlantic, an inter-continental link
could be established without having to go below 300 metres,
adopting 380 metres for the lowest stretch of  the tunnel. Therefore,
with the same gradient per metre, the stretch leading to the
lowest point would measure 16 km and the total length of  the
tunnel would be 35 km.5 Thus, for the first time, the decision was
taken to adopt the Atlantic solution as the more feasible, rather
than the shortest distance between the two shores.
What seemed to be a promising start, did not come to much. The
work done in Barcelona for planning Montjuich mountain, where
some of  the buildings for the 1929 Universal Exposition were
supposed to be sited, and the fact that he was involved in other
studies, such as the curious paper on "The fifth dimension"
presented at the Porto Congress of  Sciences in 1920, and his
article on "Human work", which appeared in Barcelona in 1924,
meant that Mariano Rubio had to give up his tunnel project.
3. The Revival of the Idea / Obnova ideje
For some time, the idea of  the tunnel seemed to have been
forgotten, until the euphoria arising from the similar project of  a
Tunnel under the English Channel, breathed new life into the idea.
Once again, a soldier would take charge, Lieutenant Colonel of
Artillery Pedro Jevenois. But, in this case, the process was far
more mature. The fact that is was only a hypothesis means that
it has to be presented in several stages:
To determine what experiences and research plans were necessary
to draw up a final project for the tunnel.
To obtain the necessary resources from the state and from
private individuals and a concession for the State Inspectorate for
an official or private body to draw up the final plans.
4 Jevenois, P., El túnel subma-
rino del Estrecho de Gibraltar,
"Estudio científico de sus posi-
bilidades", Ed. Voluntad.
Madrid s/f (1927): 45-58.
5 Ibidem: 42-45.
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Once the project had been conceived, to build the tunnel.
Once the tunnel was built, found a company to operate it.
Under these conditions, when Jevenois finished the preliminary
study, he obviously did not know exactly which solution to adopt.
He, himself, wrote in 1927:
"In our opinion, the material impossibility of  presenting a project for a tunnel
under the Gibraltar Straits that is anything other than theoretical, has been
demonstrated, because, without an exhaustive geological study, it is impossible
even to decide on the exact starting point or the mouth of the tunnel".6
Data such as the permeability of the earth under the sea-bed or
the resistance of  the sub-soil, essential for carrying out the work,
were unknown. That is why he added:
"It is obvious to us that it is impossible to know whether the undertaking is
feasible or not, or whether it would be a better idea to use a floating pipe or a
tunnel, without a costly geological and oceanographic study, which would require
the use of  excellent technical personnel and means that only the State possesses".7
But, if  the tunnel were chosen, the expert did know some basic
aspects:
- The gallery should be circular in shape in order to spread the
pressure load evenly in all directions, and it should be lined
with reinforced waterproof  cement.
- As a reference for traffic and activity, one of  the busiest lines
in Spain was used, with a concentration of 40 trains (20 in
each direction), with an annual increase in traffic being factored
in. These figures are well below minimum traffic figures for
today and are not in line with the expectations that had been
established for connecting the three basic axes of  the African
rail network.
- Ventilation of  the tunnel was projected with a large dose of
ignorance and an equal amount of  naivety. The basic premise was:
"that the passage of  the trains alone forms a current that renews the air, but
should this prove to be insufficient, it would be advisable to call on artificial
procedures" .8
On this subject, one should not forget that the tunnel was
planned to be 30 or 32 km long.
Up until 1926, the year in which Jevenois wrote a book on the
possible feasibility of the tunnel, the idea was fairly vague. It
could be said that it was limited to a series of conclusions based
on the experiences of  others; American tunnels, English, French
and German tunnels and, above all, the models of the Simplon
and Saint Gothard tunnels. This can be seen from the 18 points
considered by the author as "conditions of  the submarine tunnel"
– that are based, in turn, on the nine premises of  Charles Rolut,
the builder of the Mendor tunnel – for building long tunnels
under water and that he presented to the Paris Academy of
Sciences in 1919.
Jevenois’ conditions were as follows:
1. Linking the tunnel entrances in Africa and Europe with the general networks
of  Africa and Spain is a normal engineering problem.
2. The length of  the submarine tunnel we are proposing is less than that of
many mine galleries that have already been built, similar to the length of
some subterranean conduits and viaducts, and only slightly longer than the
great tunnels of  the world.
3. Even taking into account the enormous depth of  the narrowest part of  the
Straits, a 30 to 32 km tunnel can be dug that is suitable for the passage of
all kinds of  passenger and freight trains.
4. The possibility of using ramps and gradients of 2.5 to 5 thousandths enables
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5. If  necessary, certain ground could be used for building artificial islands,
meaning that new accesses could be opened, thus accelerating the construction
of the tunnel.
6. Water leaks are unlikely; given the impermeability of  the expected ocean
terrain, they will probably be no greater than those overcome in the Simplon,
a tunnel which passes under a lake and which came across a river.
7. With a single line and two crossings, a similar number of  trains can cross the
Straits, to those circulating on Spanish lines.
8. Ventilation of  the tunnel is a problem that the art of  modern engineering has
overcome. It is not an obstacle to building the tunnel.
9. The temperature in the tunnel will be perfectly acceptable and if  it were not,
methods of  refrigeration currently exist.
10. The progress in drilling machines makes it possible to advance in all kinds of
terrain, as experience has shown.
11. There are rules for building tunnels under water, which make it possible to
avoid accidents and disappointments, wherever humanly possible, that have
been applied in many different cases.
12. The most appropriate lining for galleries submitted to strong pressure in all
kinds of  terrains, and the most appropriate diameters for them, have been
studied.
13. The problem of  draining the tunnel has been solved in galleries that are much
longer and has been calculated and included in their plans, without resorting
to artificial means.
14. Pumping the drainage wells (of  less than 600 ms) is a normal engineering
problem, as is the construction of  these wells.
15. The profile the tunnel must adopt because of  the necessities of  drainage is
no secret whatsoever.
16. Studies and plans have been made to work on several stretches of  the tunnel
simultaneously, and work on both mouths will only be started through an
auxiliary evacuation gallery.
17. The slope that must be overcome in 15 km in the depth of  the Straits is
fairly similar to others that are overcome by existing railway lines.
18. There are electric machines that can pull ordinary trains up slopes of  up to
five millimetres per metre in double traction.9
Moreover, given the advanced state of  the preparations for building
the Channel Tunnel, drilling was expected to start on the Gibraltar
tunnel immediately afterwards, in order to profit from the experience
and even use the same material.
Jevenois was in agreement with Rubio y Bellvé when he rejected
the shortest possible distance, as this would mean having to go
too deep. Following the Channel Tunnel project, the author opted
for a double gallery without a simultaneous layout, to be connected
at periodic intervals. To avoid resistance between the two from
the geological point of  view, the communicating tunnels were to
be 6 metres long, every 15 metres along the main tunnel.
Concerning the railway line, which was the prime means of
communication, although not the only one, it should be designed
with the following features:
A design of ramps and gradients to enable trains, both trains
with Spanish gage and those using a normal gage, to cross the
Strait without tans-shipment.
Trains should not be broken up and it must be possible to
travel at speeds of  not less than 30 km/h, to reach a minimum
traffic of  20 trains in each direction.
The need to cross under the sea, dropping down 500 to 600
metres, in the centre of  the Straits. The subterranean line would
be 30 to 32 km long.
To guarantee the project, a series of  prior requisites were also
necessary:
– Draw up the geological map of the Gibraltar Straits and its
shores to a distance of  10 km inland from the coast, in order
to understand the tunnel’s entrance and exit areas. 9 Ibidem: 137-138.
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– A geological diagram to a depth of  600 metres, of  this area
and the sea bottom.
– Draw an underwater chart of  the Straits.
– Elaborate profiles of  several cross sections with their corres-
ponding geological diagrams.
Thus, the work presented by Jevenois in 1927 was really no more
than an hypothesis based on the experience of  others and merely
theoretical. Even so, his book received an excellent welcome
abroad. The Italians applauded the proposal, given their interest
in their colonies of  Tripoli and Cirenaica, which was not only
confirmed by all the fascist press, but also by more specialised
journals like "Antologia nuova", "Revista maritime", L’Italia coloniale"
and "Revista italiana de obras públicas".
The situation in France was very similar. Despite the disagreements
that existed in the Bordeaux-Marseilles axis, the Academy of
Sciences and the Geographic Society supported Jevenois’ premises.
The work aroused less interest in England and Germany, but it
was in Latin America where news of  the project was celebrated
with the creation of  tunnel committees.10
In December 1926, Jevenois approached the Ministry of  State and
the Director General for the Colonies, asking them to give their
approval to the idea of  building his tunnel; the possibility of
creating a study committee aimed at drafting the plans; and with
authority to collect all and any information existing in State
offices to carry out the study on both shores of  the Straits.
The government wanted to check the technical feasibility of the
work from the point of  view of  public resources, thus it accepted
the offer in all its terms, including personal co-operation with
Jevenois, and they were willing to carry out the project at their
expense11 . From then on, general acceptance not only increased, it
also accelerated, as can be seen from the a series of  events12 :
– 1st of September 1927: the book El túnel submarino del
Estrecho de Gibraltar (The Gibraltar Straits submarine tunnel)
was published.
– 15th of  September 1927: The extended project and an application
to for a Commission to deal with the matter were presented to the
Ministry of  Development.
– 30th of  April 1928: after an agreement of  the Council of  Ministers,
a commission was appointed to study and complete the plans.
– 27th June 1928: the African League cried out for the tunnel to
be built.
– 17th July 1928: the Government took over the management and
financing of the studies needed to check the feasibility of the
tunnel.
– 5th December 1928: geological work is carried out in Andalucia
and a site near Tarifa is chosen as a potential exit zone in Spain.
– 30th January 1929: credits are granted for the Mainland budget
and work is ordered to continue.
– 22nd February 1929: credits are granted for the budget of  the
protectorate of  Morocco.
– 1st April 1929: geological work is carried out in Africa.
– 20th April 1929: The international Mediterranean Commission
recommends that Spain carry out an intensive study of  the
Gibraltar Straits, given the interest aroused by the project.
10 Anonymous, o.c.: 17.
11 Ibidem.
12 Jevenois, P., El túnel bajo
el Estrecho y los intereses de
Ceuta, "Africa", June 1929:
154.
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4. Political Factors in the Acceptance of Jevenois’
Project / Politi~ki faktori u prihva}anju
Jevenoisovog projekta
The draft plans for the Gibraltar tunnel could not have been
drawn up at a better time. Spain, since it had lost its overseas
colonies in 1898 (Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Filipines and the Pacific
island chains) was going through one of  the most pessimistic
moments in its history. Regenerationist attempts and isolationist
temptations distorted the country, generating a general feeling of
failure. The failure of  the policy of  colonising the north of
Morocco must be added to this, with Spain’s inability to pacify
the Rift region that was in the hands of  rebels. All of  this led to
a general instability that took the shape of  serious events like the
Tragic Week of  Barcelona, in which anarchists took advantage to
wreak destruction in the city.
In 1923, General Primo de Rivera, with the acquiescence of  King
Alphonse XII, illegally took power, implanting a dictatorship that
was to last until 1930.  Fascism impregnated the new regime,
which made a desperate effort to find a worth place among
nations. In this climate, a project like the Gibraltar tunnel undoubtedly
provided the prestige desired by the Nation, transforming Spain
from being a country at the end of  Europe into an compulsory
passing place for an infinity of communications, thus becoming a
key cog in the continent of  Europe.
Because of  all of  this, the country’s ability to take charge of  a
task of  this dimension had to be demonstrated. Even years after
the fall of  the Dictatorship, the idea was kept alive and the tunnel
was the subject of articles, such as:
"Patriotism inexcusably demands not giving way to discouragement in the face of
the universal crisis of  the present moment and, it also demands that we work
with tenacious consistency until Spain occupies the place of  the great nation in
the world concert that it is entitled to, to which end her intellectuals and experts
are marching, adding their thought to the most modern currents of  progress.
Ideals that are not aggressive or attempt to compete with or put obstacles in the
way of  the initiatives of  any other nation; on the contrary, they aspire to co-
ordinate ours with theirs, but providing our own with the awareness of  our
historic value and our future possibilities."13
Spanish propaganda was clear and precise, always trying not to
raise doubts among the major powers, in order to avoid their
reservations about putting the strategic weapon of  controlling
access to Africa through the tunnel, in its hands. This is the
reason why the Spanish always claimed they had no imperialist
ideals, based on the true fact that they had a very small number
of colonies. All of this was highlighted by Spain’s colonial experience
in Latin America and their ties with Africa through the Islamic
culture that tried to expand Andalucia to include the rest of
Europe. This gave things an aspect that was attractive enough to
count on Spain in future European economic unions that, at the
time, were considered as beautiful utopias14 .
5. International Response to the Project /
Me|unarodna reakcija na projekt
This privileged position had an impact on France, dividing the
country’s public opinion. On the one hand, the Toulouse Chamber
of  Commerce, along with most of  the country, lent toward the
straits and its tunnel as a nerve centre of  Afro-European commu-
13 Comision de estudio del
tunel submarino de Gibraltar
(Gibraltar tunnel study commi-
ssion) (C.E.T.S.G. from its ini-
tials in Spanish): El túnel sub-
marino de Gibraltar. Estado
actual de los trabajos. Bolaños
and Aguilar.Madrid, 1934: 13.
14 Ibidem: 13-14.
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nication. On the other hand, the chambers of  commerce of
Marseilles, Algiers and Casablanca wanted to establish a Bordeaux
– Marseilles – Algiers and Casablanca axis as an alternative15 ,
which was really a struggle over economic interests aimed at
isolating Spain and the sector of  Morocco that she ruled, shifting
the weight of  trading relations to the Algerian-Moroccan axis, and
extending it down to Dakar as a complementary port, thus
safeguarding French interests.
Spain’s interest was, in turn, to create a sector of  renewed economic
structure based on the interests of  Southern France. The Straits
sector could become an extensive free zone for setting up processing
industries that were cheaper than the existing ones in equatorial
colonial areas.
Thus, the ports of  Ceuta and Larache were reinforced, along with
the Alcazarquivir railway line, drastically reducing the importance of
Tangiers, an international sector that did not come under Spanish
influence. The French response was a pincer formed by the trans-
Sahara route from Algiers – Oran – Niger and the Casablanca –
Tazza – Oran line that would isolate the Spanish zone.
From this point of  view, the link became the factor that ensured
the future of  Spanish influence and of  France’s high noon. As the
Toulouse chamber of  commerce clearly stated in 1934:
"We have been asking for an entente cordiale with Spain since 1911, to create an
international railway line going to Morocco, to connect with the trans-Sahara line.
This line would open the way to exploiting incalculable African riches, that would
thus find a natural exit: the intercontinental railway. In the south of  Spain, there
is a geographic point of  the greatest importance, which acts as a cork in the
African bottle. The Spaniards must be persuaded that, if  uncorked, African
products will wash over them in rivers of  gold on their way to Europe, and Spain
will be the first and greatest beneficiary of  this stream" .16
The problem was that opinion was equally divided in Spain,
without specifying the political importance the project had for the
country. Paradoxically, detractors of  the tunnel based their arguments
on the danger of  foreign interventionism, whereas the more
optimistic considered the Gibraltar tunnel as the ideal weapon for
making Spain an arbitrator in the concert of nations:
"... if, as seems possible and is being attempted, a regime of  peace is established
for five years, maybe for ten, reaching a Mediterranean pact, that would entail for
us tougher military obligations than the defence of  the Straits, the advantages for
one of  the two camps  that Europe will inexcusably be divided into, that could
be awarded to Spain, dispensing or not, passage through the tunnel, would be so
great and, by using this, it would give her the importance and category of  a great
power. If  she builds the tunnel under the Strait of  Gibraltar, it would have the
same consequences as a victorious military and naval campaign and, however, she
would only have committed money, taking whatever share of  the capital we wish,
invested in wages for Spanish workers, currently unemployed, and material, which
would provide a market for our industry and, in the end, increase the economy,
converting Spain into a nation of  intercontinental transit, riches and welfare.
These ideas are so evident that there are offers of  foreign capital that would
bring large sums to our soils."17
This was not a gratuitous controversy. Up until this time, African
communications were haphazard, dependent on the programmes
of  each country. In consequence, lines were not only independent
of each other they also varied in design, depending on the
country that built them. The gage of  the railway lines alone
varied from 0.5 metres to 1.44 m. It was not until the late
twenties that common standards were considered for lines and
connections, not just to benefit the African continent, but to open
up communications to other territories.
15 Ibidem: 15.
16 Transcript in: El túnel sub-
marino de Gibraltar,o.c.: 22.
17 Ibidem: 106.
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Up until this moment, the development of major lines that
connected the four corners of Africa was based on particular
colonial policies, like the axis the Portuguese tried to establish
between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, connecting Angola
with Mozambique; or the Cape to Cairo line, a genuine umbilical
chord of  the English North-South colonial route. Three major
routes were planned, some of  which went beyond the continent:
Tangiers – Dakar, obviously French and for purposes of  trade.
Its aim was not just to connect the different coastal territories,
but also to create an alternative to the European ports in their
traffic with Latin America, taking the place of  the Canary Islands
as a port of  call, given the greater proximity of  Dakar with Africa.
This was the only line to be built. It was started on the first of
January 1928, it ran from Uxda (chosen provisionally by the
French Parliament, whilst awaiting the final result of  the Gibraltar
tunnel project) to Dakar. In 1927, the port of  Dakar covered 225
Ha and had more than two kilometres of  piers and 25 Ha of
breakwaters, freight warehouses, docks, sea cranes of  over 50
metric tonnes, 4,600 m2 of  warehouses and 5 km of  railway lines.
Furthermore, when work started on the trans-Saharan line, the
port was given the go-ahead to expand and add two more 1,500
m docks, making it one of  the most important ports of  the West
African coast. For the Spanish, it had the attraction of  crossing
the Sahara18 .
Tangiers – Alexandria – Jerusalem. This line formed part of  the
great British dream of  connecting most of  their empire with
railway lines. They also meant to connect the capital of  Palestine
with Baghdad, Mecca and even reach India. The Franco-Spanish
stretch of  Tangiers to Fez and the later link with Taza-Algiers-
Constantine-Tunis-Gafsa was interrupted for a long time because
of  Italian reticence. Their stretch, from Tripoli-Misurata-Andjila, did
not reach Alexandria until many years later, reaching Jerusalem via
Ismailia, but there was no continuous line.
The Trans-African. This is the most ambitious of  the projects
that were never finished. The idea was to connect the port of
Tangiers with Cape Town. To this end, it would join up with the
Trans-Saharan line, conceived by France for bringing African
contingents from their different territories, to France as quickly as
possible in case of  war. This line would connect with the Belgian
Congo railways, linking with the Cairo – Cape Town line. But
England pursued a different policy in the territories of  Tanganyika
and Kenya, thus frustrating the project.
6. Works, Studies and Trials /
Radovi, studije i poku{aji
Created, as we have seen, by a disposition of  the 30th of  April
1928, the commission responsible for carrying out a preliminary
study of the technical characteristics immediately set to work. By
April of  the following year, they had decided on the terrain for
the Spanish end of  the tunnel. This was to be in Punta Peña, near
Tarifa. In the same month, Jevenois, accompanied by mining
engineer Depuy de Lome, went to Morocco to locate the other
end of  the tunnel, which was sited on the left bank of  the river
Liana, between Punta Buara and Punta Cava, near Alcazasegur19 .
Six months later, an 800 m well was dug in La Peña, a site next
to Tafira. Along with other surveys done by the Geographic
18 Ibidem: 45.
19 Anonymous: Sección infor-
mative: El túnel bajo el Estre-
cho de Gibraltar, "Revista His-
panoafricana", April, 1929:
17.
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Institute of  Spain, this confirmed Jevenois’ hypothesis in his draft
project, with regard to the quality of  the sub-soil. At the same
time Spanish navy coastguards took soundings of  the waters of
the Straits to calculate the depth at which the tunnel should be20 .
For Spain, however, these were conflictive years. In 1930 Primo de
Rivera’s dictatorship fell and on the 14th of April 1931, the king
fled the country, leaving his royal prerogatives in suspension, but
without abdicating, giving way to the II Republic. None of  this
affected the Gibraltar tunnel project, as, a few months later, the
new regime published a decree creating the Official Commission
to study the submarine tunnel of Gibraltar 21 .
The most urgent thing was to find out if  it was possible to build a
submarine tunnel, so they started to study the Earth’s crust at the
site where drilling was to start. A geological study of  the continental
part was necessary for this, which was done in three phases:
1. A detailed stratographic study of  both shores and their immediate hinterland.
2. Survey reconnaissance of  the tunnel entrance zones, once the probable tunnel
route had been set.
3. Use geo-physical means to determine the nature of  the terrain set at a
greater depth than that reached by soundings and possible definition of
vertical blocks where the tunnel would have to be sited.22
Oceanographic surveys were also carried out by the Spanish
Oceanographic Institute and the Navy. Both institutions had two
vital issues to solve to make the project feasible: the exact depth
of  the Gibraltar Strait and the characteristics of  the submerged
soil. This was no easy task: charts of the Straits contained
important mistakes. Soundings were given up, as they lost their
vertical angle due to the strong currents that pulled on the ships,
making all the reading erroneous. Thus, ultra-sound was chosen, a
technology that was just starting to be used at the time. As a
result, errors of  more than 100 metres were discovered in some
places. With regard to studying the sea-bed at great depth, at
that time, they did not have appropriate equipment for measuring
the bed, which caused the attempt to fail23 . The project was a
novelty, there was no previous experience due to its magnitude,
so technical problems arose, which had to be solved before work
could start. Thus, the need for artificially ensuring the evacuation
of  water and rubble during construction was solved with theoretical
solutions offered by Austrian and Dutch companies. The alleged
techniques used to dig and perforate the sea floor were simpler24 .
7. The End of the Utopia / Kraj utopije
Lack of  means for obtaining exact data on the sea-bed of  the
Straits delayed the work, which were finally interrupted by the
Spanish Civil War of  1936-1939. However, the desire to continue
was taken on by the rebels (who finally won the war) to the point
that in November 1936 a Dahir (A Decree of  the Moroccan Sultan)
was published to provide money to continue the tunnel studies25 .
However, this was merely a symbolic gesture. The country was
immersed in a terrible war and people only lived for victory. Jevenois
took the side of  the mutineering officers, he was promoted to
Colonel and took command of the northern sector of Cadiz. He was
promoted to the rank of  Brigade General in 1938 and Chief  of
Artillery of  the Southern Army. After the war, he was appointed
Military Governor of  Cadiz and died shortly afterwards, in May 1941.
20 Ibidem.
21 "Gaceta de Madrid", n.
437, 13th Dec. 1931: 7.
22 C.E.T.S.G.: El túnel sub-
marino de Gibraltar,o.c.: 61.
23 Anonymous: Trabajos
efectuados por la Comisión de
túnel de Gibraltar en 1933,
"Ingeniería y Construcción",
Madrid, 1934. n.134: 669-
670.
24 Ibidem.
25 "Spanish Gazette for the
Area of Spanish influence
in Morocco", n. 24, vol. II,
14thNov. 1936: 1064-1065.
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Even if  events had not taken such a dramatic turn, we doubt that
the Gibraltar tunnel project could have been successfully carried
out at this time. Reconnaissance of  the sea-bed in the Straits
remained a problem without solution. Attempts to photograph the
depths failed due to a lack of the right technology at the time.
The composition of  the rock to be perforated was also impossible
to establish, as we have already seen. Starting to drill, therefore,
would have been dangerous.
The Civil War was followed by World War Two (1939-1945), and this,
in turn, by the U.N. embargo against Spain, which was not lifted until
the Hispano-American accords of  1953. This was when the idea of
the tunnel could once again be considered. The Institute of  African
Studies and the Directorate General for Morocco promoted an extensive
cycle of  conferences in 1954 and 1955, on transport across the
Straits of  Gibraltar. Several different proposals were put forward,
resorting to all kinds of  available means: Jáuregui said literally "Euro-
African relations are more of  a problem of  roads and highways" 26 ,
José de Aguinaga called for the help of  ferry boats27 and Navascués
Revuelta complemented the idea with the use of  aeroplanes28 .
Amid all these criticisms, two voices were raised, calling for road
communication across the straits: Alfonso Peña Boeuf, who contributed
the novelty of offering the solution of a suspension bridge29 and
Carlos Ibáñez Ibero, who stuck to the idea of  a tunnel.
This engineer belonged to a group of  experts that had considered
this kind of  solution in the first decade of  the 20th century. Nine
years before Jevenois, Ibáñez had presented a tunnel proposal
that was forgotten in the face of  this opponent’s brilliant project.
Now, 40 years later, he presented three routes:
– A straight line from the Valdevaqueros entrance to Tangiers.
– From Enseñada de Bolonia, heading west, to end up in La
Punta Al Boassa.
– From Cape Trafalgar to Punta Malabata.
8. Epilogue / Epilog
Direct communication between the two continents, as we know,
did not take the shape of  any specific work. The year after this
latest project, Morocco gained independence and was re-united;
within 10 years, the whole of  North Africa was free and independent.
In consequence, a radical change occurred in the policies and
economic approaches of  the colonial powers. If  the project had
been thus far considered as a work for the benefit of  Spain and,
in a broader sense, for Europe, attention now had to be paid to
the opinion and the will, not only of the new nation, but also of
the continent’s other territories. Africa was no longer a supply
depot for European nations, or a sales post for selling the stocks
of  the markets of  the Old Continent. Because of  all this, tunnels
and bridges, feasible or not, were no longer so comfortably profitable.
Moreover, de-colonialisation had created a new problem: in the
barrier between the North and the South, put in place after African
independence, the Straits were a comfortable way of  filtering
communications with Africa. Opening up a new two-way access
meant facilitating illegal immigration and with it, control of  access
to the rich countries; and that was the last thing that Europe
wanted at a time when it was gradually becoming a centre of
welfare in the midst of  a world of  backwardness and poverty.
26 Jauregui, J. J., Las comu-
nicaciones ibero-africanas
en el pasado y en el presente,
in: Las comunicaciones euro-
africanas a través del estre-
cho de Gibraltar, tome III,
the Supreme Council of
Scientific Research, Madrid,
1956: 50.
27 Aguinaga, J., from:
Cooperación que los tran-
sportes nacionales pueden
prestar para desarrollar el
tráfico euroafricano, in: Las
comunicaciones euroafri-
canas a través del estrecho
de Gibraltar, tome III, the
Supreme Council of Scientific
Research, Madrid 1956:  66.
28 Navascues R. J.: Conve-
niencia de iniciar con la carre-
tera la continuidad en las
comunicaciones euroafrica-
nas in: Las comunicaciones
euroafricanas a través del
estrecho de Gibraltar, tome
II, Supreme Council of Sci-
entific Research, Madrid,
1956: 115-116.
29 This subject was dealt
with in our article El túnel
de Gibraltar, in the press.
A. Darias Principe: A Colonial ... Pag. 143-156Vol.7(1999), No.2(18)PROSTOR
154
SL. 1. Gibraltarska stijena
FG. 1. The Rock of
Gibraltar
SL. 2. Gibraltar -
satelitska snimka
FG. 2. Gibraltar -
satellite photograph
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Sa`etak • Summary
Kolonijalna utopija
Kopnena veza preko Gibraltarskog tjesnaca
Poku{aji da se izgradi veza izme|u Europe i Afrike pojavili su se sredinom XIX.
st. kada je razvoj tehni~kih mogu}nosti dozvolio ~ovjeku da po~ne razmi{ljati o
prevladavanju fizi~kih zapreka.
Francuski in`enjer Laurent de Villedemil napravio je prvi projekt 1860. g. i od
{panjolske vlade dobio koncesiju da izgradi tunel. Projekt je bankrotirao jer su
investitori povukli kapital zbog tada{nje politi~ke nestabilnosti u [panjolskoj.
Uslijedili su drugi projekti: Juan Bautista Berlier na prijelazu stoje}a, Henry Bressler
1918. g., itd. [panjolske studije stigle su kasnije ali su bile sveobuhvatnije. In`enjer
García Faria je pregovara~ima na Konferenciji Algericas (1906. g.) predstavio
`eljezni~ku vezu izme|u {panjolskih i al`irskih ̀ eljeznica koja je uklju~ivala studiju
za podvodni tunel. Trinaest godina kasnije drugi in`enjer, Carlos Mendoza, predlo`io
je mre`u cijevi koje bi igrale ulogu tunela.
Me|utim, prvi ozbiljan projekt predstavio je in`enjer i pisac Mariano Rubio y
Belve. Njegov je pristup bio prije znanstven nego intuitivan te je izdao knjigu
Veza preko Gibraltarskog tjesnaca s mnogo tehni~kih podataka i s teoretskom
razradom. Njegov rad nije sadr`avao dobru geolo{ku studiju, ali je s druge strane
to bio prvi projekt koji je potra`io povoljniju iako du`u trasu.
Neko se vrijeme na sve zaboravilo, a tada je euforija koja se digla oko projekta tunela
ispod Kanala La Manche ponovno probudila duhove. Artiljerijski pukovnik Pedro
Jevenois postavljen je na ~elo osuvremenjivanja projekta. Plan napada je podijelio u
~etiri stupnja:
1. Odrediti koja su iskustva i ispitivanja potrebna da bi se izradili planovi;
2. Pribaviti potrebna sredstva i ponudu za ugovor od dr`ave i od privatnih izvora;
3. Nakon izrade planova, izgraditi tunel;
4. Nakon izgradnje tunela, osnovati dru{tvo koje }e njime upravljati.
Jevenois je 1926. g. napisao knjigu o izvedivosti izgradnje tunela; zamisao se
zasnivala na tu|im iskustvima pri gradnji ameri~kih, engleskih, francuskih i njema~kih
tunela, ali se uglavnom zasnivala na modelu nedavno izgra|enih tunela Simplon i
St. Gothard. Jevenoisov je pristup imao 18 to~aka koje su po~ivale na 9 premisa
Charlesa Roluta za izgradnju dugih podvodnih tunela. U to vrijeme je projekt za
Tunel La Manche ve} bio dosta odmakao pa je Jevenois imao priliku da odmah
po~ne graditi Gibraltarski tunel koriste}i se znanjem i  materijalima koji su se
koristili za Tunel La Manche. Arhitekt je zagovarao odbacivanje najkra}e trase da
bi se izbjegla prevelika dubina.
Rad koji je 1927. g. predstavio Jevenois bio je tek hipoteza, ali je ipak bio dobro
primljen. Projekt je pobudio tako veliko zanimanje da su izme|u rujna 1927. g. i travnja
1928. g. po~ele birokratske pripreme na osnovi kojih je Me|unarodno povjerenstvo za
Sredozemlje izdalo preporuku [panjolskoj da sprovede intenzivno prou~avanje tjesnaca.
Politi~ki trenutak za po~etak projekta bio je idealan. Poslije dva desetlje}a borbi,
[panjolska je uspjela ugu{iti pobunu u svojim marokanskim posjedima i `eljela je
pokazati ostalim europskim zemljama da je sposobna kolonizirati zauzeta podru~ja.
Me|unarodna zajednica pru`ila je jednoglasnu podr{ku; samo su sjeverna Francuska
i kolonije Francuske sjeverne Afrike bile suzdr`ane. To je bilo i za o~ekivati, jer
bi pravac koji su prihvatile kolonijalne sile povezao `eljezni~ke mre`e Europe,
Afrike i Azije kroz tunel i dovele do opasnosti da neki predjeli izgube na va`nosti
kada se promijene pravci `eljezni~ke mre`e.
Ispitivanja su zapo~ela i u Maroku i u [panjolskoj. Tada su [panjolski gra|anski
rat (1936-1939) i Drugi svjetski rat (1939-1945) prekinuli radove, a nakon toga
uslijedio embargo je Ujedinjenih naroda protiv [panjolske (1945-1953). Kada je
embargo prekinut te se ~inilo da je sazrijelo vrijeme za ponovni po~etak rada na
projektu, Maroko je dobio nezavisnost.
Kako svi znamo, projekt nikada nije ostvaren, velikim dijelom zbog korjenitih
politi~kih i gospodarskih promjena u Sjevernoj Africi. Ona vi{e nije bila podru~je s
kojeg su se snabdijevale europske sile. U to se vrijeme po~eo pojavljivati jo{ jedan
problem koji se, kako su prolazile godine, sve vi{e pogor{avao; ilegalna imigracija.
Ljudi su izgubili zanimanje za Gibraltarski tunel velikim dijelom i zbog toga jer je
tjesnac prirodna granica, sredstvo kontrole tijekova doseljavanja koje je stvorila
pro{la kolonijalna politika u Africi.
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Prof. dr. sc. Alberto Darias Principe je ro|en 1945. g. na Kanarskim
otocima ([panjolska).  Diplomirao je povijest na Sveu~ili{tu La Laguna sa
znanstvenim projektom Spomenici na otoku La Gomera. Kasnije je obranio
doktorsku disertaciju "Arhitektura i arhitekti zapadnih Kanarskih otoka
1874.-1931.g.", koja je dobila posebnu nagradu. Te su dvije teme bile u
sredi{tu istra`ivanja u po~ecima njegove stru~ne karijere.
Po~eo je predavati na Sveu~ili{tu La Laguna i na javnom natje~aju dobio
mjesto profesora povijesti umjetnosti. Uglavnom je podu~avao modernu i
suvremenu arhitekturu. Istovremeno se bavio znanstvenim radom koji je
doveo do objavljivanja velikog broja ~lanaka u knjigama i ~asopisima o
arhitekturi i urbanizmu na Kanarskim otocima u XIX. i XX. stolje}u.
U najnovije vrijeme uglavnom istra`uje baroknu ikonografiju protureformacije,
arhitekturu XIX. stolje}a u Latinskoj Americi sa stanovi{ta potrage za
nacionalnim identitetom, te {panjolski utjecaj na arhitekturu i urbanizam
za vrijeme Protektorata u sjevernom Maroku.
Profesor Darias se mnogo bavio i povijesno-umjetni~kom ba{tinom. Bio je
savjetnik za povijest tijekom restauracije mnogih crkava, pala~a i ku}a, ~lan
Oto~kog odbora za ba{tinu otoka Tenerife i La Gomera, te savjetnik Vlade
Kanarskih otoka. Sada upravlja crkvenom ba{tinom zapadnih Kanarskih otoka.
Alberto Darias je ~lan Instituta za studije Kanarskih otoka, Instituta
hispanskih studija i posebni predstavnik Kraljevskih akademija likovnih
umjetnosti San Fernando (Madrid), San Carlos (Valencia), Santa Isabel de
Hungria (Sevilja) i San Telmo (Malaga). Vrlo je aktivni predava~ u kulturnim
organizacijama Kanarskih otoka, te na sveu~ili{tima kopnene [panjolske i
Latinske Amerike.
Prof. Alberto Darias Príncipe, PhD, was born in 1945, in the Canary Islands
(Spain). He got a degree in History from the University de La Laguna with
his research project Monuments of  the Island of  La Gomera. He later got
a PhD with a thesis entitled "Architecture and Architects of  the Western
Canary Islands 1874-1931", which won a special prize. These two subjects
were the focus of  his research in the early years of  his professional career.
He started teaching at University de La Laguna and later won a place as
Resident Professor in History of  Art in a public competition. He mainly
taught about modern and contemporary architecture. At the same time,
he did research work, which has led to the publication of  a large number
of  articles in books and journals on architecture and town planning in
the Canary Islands in the XIX and XX centuries.
In recent years, his research work has been focussed on the fields of
counter-reformist Baroque iconography, XIX century Latin American archi-
tecture from the standpoint of  its search for a national identity and
Spanish architectural and planning influences during the time of  the
Protectorate in the north of  Morocco.
Professor Darias has also done much work on historic-artistic heritage, as
a consultant historian in the restoration work done on many different
churches, palaces and houses; as a member of  the Island Heritage
Committee for the islands of  Tenerife and La Gomera and as an advisor
to the Canary Island Government. He currently manages the ecclesiastical
heritage of  the western Canary Islands.
Alberto Darias is a member of  the Institute of  Canary Island Studies, the
Institute of  Hispanic Studies and is the special representative of  the Royal
Academies of  Fine Arts of  San Fernando (Madrid), San Carlos (Valencia),
Santa Isabel de Hungría (Seville) and San Telmo (Málaga). He is very active
on the lecture and course circuit in cultural organisations in the Canary
Islands and in Universities on the Spanish mainland and in Latin America.
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